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Recent research on moral decision-making has suggested that many common moral judg-
ments are based on immediate intuitions. However, some individuals arrive at highly coun-
terintuitive utilitarian conclusions about when it is permissible to harm other individuals.
Such utilitarian judgments have been attributed to effortful reasoning that has overcome
our natural emotional aversion to harming others. Recent studies, however, suggest that
such utilitarian judgments might also result from a decreased aversion to harming others,
due to a deﬁcit in empathic concern and social emotion. The present study investigated the
neural basis of such indifference to harming using functional neuroimaging during engage-
ment in moral dilemmas. A tendency to counterintuitive utilitarian judgment was associ-
ated both with ‘psychoticism’, a trait associated with a lack of empathic concern and
antisocial tendencies, and with ‘need for cognition’, a trait reﬂecting preference for effortful
cognition. Importantly, only psychoticism was also negatively correlated with activation in
the subgenual cingulate cortex (SCC), a brain area implicated in empathic concern and
social emotions such as guilt, during counterintuitive utilitarian judgments. Our ﬁndings
suggest that when individuals reach highly counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions, this
need not reﬂect greater engagement in explicit moral deliberation. It may rather reﬂect
a lack of empathic concern, and diminished aversion to harming others.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Most people think that it would be wrong to kill a stran-
ger by pushing him onto the track of a runaway trolley in
order to save the lives of ﬁve others. There is, however, a
small minority that adopts the utilitarian view that we
should push the stranger because this would save a greater
number of lives (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006). Such
utilitarian views are controversial. Many people ﬁnd them
repugnant, and utilitarianism is often portrayed as a cold
2 The coldness in question refers to a lack of empathic concern and
diminished prosocial emotion. It need not imply a general absence of
emotion. Indeed, patients with VMPFC damage and psychopaths reject
more unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game, a response pattern that is likely
to be due to increased anger (Koenigs et al., 2007). In line with this, a recent
study reports that a general disposition to feel angry was associated with
greater rates of utilitarian judgment (Choe & Min, 2011).
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sensibility (Hazlitt, 1824/1991). Utilitarians, however, ar-
gue that their counterintuitive conclusions are simply
what results when, instead of just following our immediate
gut reactions, we use moral reasoning to critically scruti-
nize them (Singer, 2005; Unger, 1996). They claim that
utilitarians are not colder than other people; but they
may appear so because they are more ‘calculating’ or
rational.
Recent research has been taken to support for the latter
view. Neuroimaging studies of affect-laden moral dilem-
mas have been taken to suggest that non-utilitarian or
‘deontological’ judgments (e.g. ‘don’t push the stranger’)
are based on a pre-potent emotional aversion to directly
harming others (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen,
2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen,
2001). By contrast, utilitarian judgments (e.g. ‘push the
stranger to save ﬁve others’) in difﬁcult dilemmas were
associated with increased activation in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and inferior parietal lobe, areas
implicated in deliberative processing, and in the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), an area implicated in
the detection and resolution of conﬂict (Greene et al.,
2004). In addition, recent studies have reported that cogni-
tive load increased response times in utilitarian judgments
but not in deontological ones (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg,
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008), and that subjects higher on ‘need
for cognition’ (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), a
motivational tendency to seek and enjoy effortful cognitive
activity, exhibited greater rates of utilitarian judgment
(Bartels, 2008). These ﬁndings suggest that utilitarian
judgments involve the use of effortful, deliberative pro-
cessing to overcome an immediate emotional response
(Greene, 2008; though see Kahane, 2012; Kahane &
Shackel, 2010; Kahane et al., 2012).
Several recent studies, however, indicate that utilitarian
judgment can also be the consequence of a lack of empathic
concern. Some evidence for this comes from clinical popula-
tions. Patients with lesions in the VMPFC (Ciaramelli,
Muccioli, Làdavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al.,
2007; Moretto, Làdavas, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 2009)
and with frontotemporal dementia (Mendez, Anderson, &
Shapira, 2005), conditions associated with deﬁcits in em-
pathic concern and social emotion and with disordered so-
cial behavior, exhibit increased rates of utilitarian
judgment in emotionally-loaded moral dilemmas, appar-
ently because such patients lack the prepotent aversive re-
sponse to harming. A recent study has shown that
utilitarian judgments in patients with VMPFC damage were
associated with weaker skin conductance responses, and
with shorter reaction times, compared to healthy subjects
(Moretto et al., 2009), further suggesting that in these pa-
tients utilitarian judgments do not require the overcoming
of an aversion to harming others.
However, diminished social emotion can also be found
in the non-clinical population. It is thus plausible that util-
itarian judgments in healthy individuals might also be
rooted in an atypically weak or even absent aversion to
harming others. This would explain the otherwise puzzling
ﬁndings that increased rates of utilitarian judgment in
healthy individuals are predicted by individual differencesin aversive reactivity to harming others, as indexed by
peripheral vasoconstriction (Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, &
Mendes, 2012), and are associated with lower response
times (Greene et al., 2008) and reduced skin conductance
response (Moretto et al., 2009). In addition, recent studies
report that such a tendency to utilitarian judgment in
healthy subjects is associated with lower rates of trait
empathy (Choe & Min, 2011; Crockett, Clark, Hauser, &
Robbins, 2010), and higher levels of testosterone (Carney
& Mason, 2010), which has been associated with reduced
empathic concern (Hermans, Putman, & Van Honk, 2006).
Most importantly, several recent studies report greater
rates of utilitarian judgment in individuals high on
psychopathy (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Glenn, Koleva, Iyer,
Graham, & Ditto, 2010; Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & New-
man, 2012), although interestingly such a relation was
not observed in some studies of psychiatric patients and
criminal offenders (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010; Glenn,
Raine, & Schug, 2009).
There is thus a growing body of evidence indicating that
utilitarian judgment in the healthy population may be
based, not in greater deliberative effort as suggested by
earlier research (Greene, 2008), but in a diminished or ab-
sent aversion to harming that is, moreover, associated with
antisocial traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). On this emerging
picture of utilitarian judgment, utilitarians approach moral
decisions in a calculating manner because they are ‘colder’
than other people.2
However, the neural mechanisms that underlie individ-
ual differences in utilitarian judgment remain unclear, and
there has so far been no attempt to integrate these seem-
ingly contrasting lines of evidence. One plausible hypothe-
sis is that there are two distinct pathways to utilitarian
judgement. Some individuals might make utilitarian judg-
ments because they are more calculating or ‘rational’, and
others because they are colder. It cannot yet be ruled out,
however, that the evidence associating utilitarian judg-
ment with greater cognitive effort at least partly reﬂects
the more calculating form that moral decision-making
takes in the absence of normal emotional input.
Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) in healthy volunteers to investigate the neural basis
of reduced aversion to harming in counterintuitive utilitar-
ian judgment. Unlike previous studies, we employed mea-
sures of individual differences both in ‘coldness’ and in
‘calculation’. We predicted that two distinct personality
traits would be associated with a greater tendency to utili-
tarian judgment in emotionally-loaded dilemmas: need for
cognition, amotivational tendency to seek effortful cognitive
activity (Cacioppo et al., 1996), and psychoticism, a subscale
of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1991) that reﬂects lackof emotionality, diminished
empathic concern, aggression and non-conformity to social
3 Example of DI dilemma: ‘‘A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks
toward ﬁve workmen who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its
present course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the
approaching trolley and the ﬁve workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is
a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save the lives of
the ﬁve workmen is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks
below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you
do this, but the ﬁve workmen will be saved. Should you push the stranger
onto the tracks in order to save the ﬁve workmen?’’
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tivity to violence in normal individuals (Bruggemann & Barry,
2002) as well as with psychopathy (Hare, 1982; Shine & Hob-
son,1997), a constructoftenseenas lyingonacontinuumwith
psychoticism (Corr, 2010; Eysenck, 1992) although, unlike
psychopathy, psychoticism primarily aims to capture a gen-
eral dimension of personality in the normal population.
We recently showed that counterintuitive judgments
across a range of moral contexts are associated with great-
er perceived difﬁculty and with activation in the subgenual
part of the anterior cingulate cortex (Kahane et al., 2012), a
brain area previously implicated in the processing of social
information (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth,
2008), and in altruistic donation decisions (Moll et al.,
2006). The subgenual cingulate cortex (SCC) has been
repeatedly implicated in negative emotions such as sad-
ness (Mayberg et al., 2000), including feeling sad for the
victim of a harmful action (Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler,
2012). Several recent studies have also associated the
SCC with guilt, a self-directed negative emotional response
to the belief that one has violated a moral norm (Green,
Ralph, Moll, Stamatakis, & Zhan, 2010; Zahn, de Oliveira-
Souza, Bramati, Garrido, & Moll, 2009b; Zahn et al.,
2009a). Importantly, SCC activation in the context of guilt
was found to reﬂect individual differences in empathic
concern (Zahn et al., 2009b).
Interestingly, the lesions in patients with VMPFC dam-
age typically extend to the SCC, and previous studies report
that individuals with VMPFC damage are signiﬁcantly less
likely to feel guilt when they violate social norms (Krajb-
ich, Adolphs, Tranel, Denburg, & Camerer, 2009). Indeed,
it has been suggested that VMPFC patients exhibit greater
rates of utilitarian judgment due to a deﬁcit in empathic
concern and the capacity to feel guilt (Moll & de Oliveira-
Souza, 2007; Moretto et al., 2009). In line with this, a re-
cent study found that healthy individuals predominantly
associate utilitarian judgments with feeling guilty (Choe
& Min, 2011).
These previous ﬁndings suggest that activation in the
SCC may reﬂect aversive feelings such as guilt that are
associated with agreeing to harm others and generally
with the perceived violation of moral norms. Since psych-
oticism is associated with reduced empathic concern,
aggression and insensitivity to social norms, we therefore
predicted that utilitarian judgments by individuals higher
on psychoticism should be reﬂected in decreased activa-
tion in the SCC yet not with increased activity in the DLPFC,
a brain area generally implicated in explicit deliberation,
and which has been previously associated with counterin-
tuitive utilitarian judgment (Greene et al., 2004)—though
as noted above, a reduced emotional response might also
encourage a more ‘calculating’ approach to moral dilem-
mas. At the behavioural level, we predicted that such judg-
ments would be associated with lower perceived difﬁculty.
By contrast, if utilitarian judgments by individuals high-
er on ‘need for cognition’ involve greater engagement of
explicit deliberation, they should be associated with in-
creased activation in the DLPFC but not with decreased
activation in the SCC. In addition, we would expect that in-
creased deliberative effort would be reﬂected in increase in
perceived difﬁculty.The above predictions are speciﬁc to moral dilemmas
where, in order to save the greater number of lives, it is
necessary to directly kill or signiﬁcantly harm someone.
In this type of dilemma, such a utilitarian choice is typi-
cally highly counterintuitive. Here, we also employed a
range of new dilemmas that involved more everyday
choices such as whether to lie to someone to avoid hurting
them (see also Kahane et al., 2012). In these dilemmas, it is
rather the deontological choice (e.g. to tell a harmful truth)
that most people ﬁnd counterintuitive. This new category
of dilemma allowed us to disentangle the respective con-
tribution of intuitiveness and content (utilitarian vs. deon-
tological) to moral judgments. In order to investigate
whether the hypothesized inﬂuence of ‘need for cognition’
and psychoticism on moral decision-making is speciﬁc to
counterintuitive utilitarian judgment, we further exam-
ined their effect in this new category of dilemmas.
Although individuals higher on psychoticism might feel
less bound by moral rules such as the prohibition against
lying, they might also be less reluctant to bluntly assert
deeply hurtful truths. It is thus unclear that psychoticism
should be associated with a distinctive pattern of response
to this type of dilemma. By contrast, one would expect
individuals who are attracted to effortful reﬂection to exhi-
bit a general tendency to arrive at moral conclusions that
go contrary to common intuitions. We therefore predicted
that ‘need for cognition’ would be associated with greater
rates of counterintuitive judgment and DLPFC activation
across both categories of moral dilemmas.
2. Method
The experimental setup and stimuli used in this study
have been described elsewhere (Kahane et al., 2012). Here,
we brieﬂy summarize the methods and data analysis rele-
vant to the research question of the present paper.
2.1. Subjects
Sixteen healthy, right-handed subjects (9 female, mean
age, 29.25, range, 21–41) participated in the study. The vol-
unteers were pre-assessed to exclude those who self-re-
ported a previous history of neurological or psychiatric
illness. All subjects gave informed consent, and the study
was approved by the local Research Ethics Committee.
2.2. Experimental design and protocol
Two types of dilemmas were employed in the study:
dilemmas where the deontological judgment is more intu-
itive (DI dilemmas3; N = 8), which were largely drawn from
the ‘personal dilemmas’ used by Greene et al. (2001), as well
K. Wiech et al. / Cognition 126 (2013) 364–372 367as new dilemmas where the utilitarian judgment is more
intuitive (UI dilemmas4; N = 10). ‘Utilitarian judgment’ was
deﬁned as the choice, of the two available, that would lead
to the better aggregate consequence. A choice was classiﬁed
as ‘intuitive’ (relative to a population) if it was chosen by 12
or more of 18 independent judges who were asked to give
their unreﬂective opinion; the contrary choice was classiﬁed
as ‘counterintuitive’ (for further details on the classiﬁcation
of dilemmas see Kahane et al., 2012).
The experiment participants performed while they
were lying in the scanner was divided into four sessions,
each lasting about 10 min. UI and DI dilemmas were pre-
sented in randomized order. Each dilemma was presented
as text through a series of three screens, the ﬁrst two
describing a scenario and the last posing a question about
the moral appropriateness of an action one might perform
in that scenario (e.g., to push the large stranger). Each
screen was presented for 15 s. After reading the third
screen, subjects responded by pressing one of two buttons
(‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’) to indicate whether they agreed to the sug-
gested solution. Participants were instructed to read the
text quietly, and to press the response button as soon as
they had made their decision. No visual feedback was gi-
ven upon the decision. At the end of each dilemma subjects
were prompted to rate the difﬁculty of the dilemma using
a Numerical Rating Scale ranging from 0 (=‘‘not difﬁcult at
all’’) to 100 (=‘‘very difﬁcult’’). Participants were given 6 s
for the rating. At the end of each trial subjects were in-
structed to ﬁxate a white cross that was displayed in the
centre of the computer screen for 12 s (baseline).2.3. Questionnaires
Prior to the scanning session all participants ﬁlled in pa-
per-and-pencil versions of the Eysenck Personality Ques-
tionnaire (48-item EPQ-R Short Scale; Eysenck & Eysenck,
1991) and the short form of the ‘Need for cognition’ scale
(Cacioppo et al., 1996).2.4. Image acquisition
MR scanningwas performed on a 3TMRI system (Oxford
Magnet Technology, Oxford, UK) with the use of a Nova
Medical quadrature birdcage coil (Nova Medical, Wilming-
ton, USA). For the functional measurements, 33 axial slices
(slice thickness 3 mm) were acquired using a gradient echo
echo-planar (EPI) T2-sensitive sequence (repetition time,
2.38 s, echo time, 30 ms; ﬂip angle, 90; matrix, 64  64;
ﬁeld of view, 192192 mm2). SubjectsworeMR-compatible
electrostatic headphones to attenuate the scanner noise. For4 Example of UI dilemma: ‘‘The husband of your close friend Jane told
you that he had a secret romantic involvement with another woman four
years ago but would never want to do so again, since his marriage means so
much to him. On a night out with Jane she mentions that she was worried
about her marriage four years ago. Jane goes on to say that her marriage is
immensely important to her and that if her husband was ever unfaithful it
would destroy the marriage because she would never be able to trust him
again. She asks whether you’ve ever heard anything to suggest her husband
isn’t faithful. Should you tell Jane that her husband had an affair?’’ For a
complete list of dilemmas see Kahane et al. (2012).information regarding coverage of relevant brain regions,
see Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2.2.5. Data analysis
For the two personality traits (i.e., psychoticism and
‘need for cognition’) scores were calculated according to
the questionnaires’ manuals and z-transformed to allow
for direct comparison. Pearson correlation coefﬁcients (1-
tailed tests) were calculated for the relationship between
the two questionnaire scores and (i) the number of counter-
intuitive utilitarian judgments (in DI dilemmas), (ii) the
number of counterintuitive deontological judgments (in UI
dilemmas), (iii) the averagedifﬁculty rating for counterintu-
itive utilitarian judgment and (iii) the average difﬁculty rat-
ing for counterintuitive deontological judgments.
For the neuroimaging data image preprocessing and
statistical analysis were carried out using SPM5 (http://
www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The ﬁrst ﬁve image volumes
of each session were discarded to account for T1 relaxation
effects. The remaining volumes were realigned to the sixth
volume to correct for head motion before statistical analy-
sis. The EPI images were spatially normalized (Friston
et al., 1995) to the template of the Montréal Neurological
Institute (MNI; Evans et al., 1993). The normalized EPI-
images were smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM (full-width
at half maximum) Gaussian kernel, temporally high-pass
ﬁltered (cut-off 128 s) and corrected for temporal autocor-
relations using ﬁrst-order autoregressive modelling.
In order to investigate the relationship between the two
personality traits and the neural processes in the SCC and
DLPFC during counterintuitive utilitarian judgments in DI
dilemmas, we ﬁrst computed two simple regression analy-
ses. In the ﬁrst simple regression analysis, ﬁrst level images
reﬂecting brain activation during counterintuitive utilitar-
ian moral judgements were entered into a second level
regression analysis with z-transformed psychoticism
scores as a regressor. In the second analysis, individual
‘need for cognition’ scores were considered as a regressor
in the analysis of brain responses during counterintuitive
utilitarian judgments, again using ﬁrst level images reﬂect-
ing brain activation during counterintuitive utilitarian
moral judgements. In order to identify brain regions show-
ing a signiﬁcantly stronger correlation with one of the two
personality measures during counterintuitive utilitarian
judgments, we subsequently performed a multiple regres-
sion analysis (Nichols, 2008). In this analysis, ﬁrst level
contrast images representing activation during counterin-
tuitive utilitarian moral judgments were entered into a
new model with the two questionnaire scores as covari-
ates. The design matrix therefore comprised two regres-
sors, one representing activation during counterintuitive
utilitarian judgments that is correlated with individual
psychoticism scores and one representing the same activa-
tion during counterintuitive utilitarian judgments but this
time correlated with ‘need for cognition’ scores. On the
group level, we used a ‘‘1 1’’ contrast to test for any vox-
els showing a signiﬁcantly stronger negative correlation
with ‘need for cognition’ than with psychoticism using a
t-statistic. Conversely, the contrast deﬁned as ‘‘1 1’’
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with psychoticism than for ‘need for cognition’.
In order to explore the results of the multiple regression
analyses in more detail, parameter estimates were extracted
from the peak voxel and plotted against the individual psych-
oticism and ‘need for cognition’ scores. Following a similar
procedure recently adopted by Zahn et al. (2009b), we consid-
ered effects of the three regression analyses as signiﬁcant if
they survived an uncorrected voxel-level signiﬁcance thresh-
old of p < 0.01 and in addition a family-wise error (FWE) cor-
rected threshold in a 5mm sphere around the original left or
right hemispheric homologue of the mean coordinate (Mon-
treal Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates (x, y, z): 8.5,
25.5,5.5) of SCC activations that have recently been reported
in relation to guilt and empathic concern (Moll et al., 2006;
Zahn et al., 2009a). For the DLPFC, the same small volume cor-
rectionwas applied to a 5mm sphere around theMNI coordi-
nate (x, y, z = 16, 55, 8) reported byGreene et al., 2004 (though
for a different anatomical labeling, see Moll & de Oliveira-
Souza, 2007). All coordinates are given in MNI space.
Because neither of the two personality traits showed a
signiﬁcant correlation with the number of counterintuitive
deontological decisions in UI dilemmas (see Results for de-
tails), we decided to not pursue the analysis of individual
differences in counterintuitive deontological judgments
at the neural level.3. Results
3.1. Behavioral data
3.1.1. Correlations between personality traits and number of
counterintuitive utilitarian judgments
As predicted, the number of counterintuitive utilitarian
decisions was positively correlated both with psychoticism
(r = 0.58, p = 0.012; Fig. 1A) and with ‘need for cognition’
(r = 0.51, p = 0.023; Fig. 1B). These two scales were statisti-
cally independent (r = 0.07, p = 0.81).
The frequency of making a counterintuitive deontologi-
cal decision was not signiﬁcantly correlated with psychot-
icism (r = 0.10, p = 0.361) or ‘need for cognition’ (r = 0.33,
p = 0.104).3.1.2. Correlations between personality traits and perceived
difﬁculty
Based on our hypothesis that ‘need for cognition’ but
not psychoticism should be associated with greater delib-Fig. 1. Correlation between personality traits and number of counterintuitive uti
signiﬁcant positive correlation with the number of counterintuitive utilitarian jerative effort while making a counterintuitive decision,
we investigated the correlation between the two personal-
ity traits and perceived difﬁculty during decision-making.
For counterintuitive utilitarian decisions, ‘need for cogni-
tion’ scores showed a clear trend towards a positive corre-
lation with perceived difﬁculty (r = 0.449, p = 0.05) while
psychoticism (r = 0.029, p = 0.46) was not signiﬁcantly cor-
related with difﬁculty ratings.
For counterintuitive deontological decisions, neither
psychoticism nor ‘need for cognition’ showed a signiﬁcant
correlation with perceived difﬁculty (psychoticism:
r = 0.434, p = 0.061; ‘need for cognition’: r = 0.133,
p = 0.333). Given the observation that psychoticism and
‘need for cognition’ were not related to the number of
counterintuitive deontological decisions or the perceived
difﬁculty of making such judgment, we decided to not pur-
sue the analysis of individual differences in counterintui-
tive deontological judgments at the neural level.
3.2. Neuroimaging data
Because psychoticism but not ‘need for cognition’
should be associated with a diminished empathic concern
and aversion to harming, only the ﬁrst should show a neg-
ative correlation with SCC activation. Results of the two
simple regression analyses conﬁrm this hypothesis. The
higher the participants scored on the psychoticism scale,
the lower the activation in the SCC (x, y, z = 3, 30, 3;
SVC: x, y, z = 9, 24, 3, p = 0.02, FWE-corrected) during
counterintuitive utilitarian judgments (Fig. 2A; Table S1).
A negative correlation with DLPFC activation did not sur-
vive correction. ‘Need for cognition’ showed no signiﬁcant
negative correlation with either of the two brain regions
(Table S2).
In a second step we directly compared the correlations
with the two personality traits using a multiple regression
analysis. In this analysis, ﬁrst level contrast images repre-
senting activation during counterintuitive utilitarian moral
judgments were entered into a new model with the two
questionnaire scores as covariates. The direct comparison
of the two covariate regressors revealed that activation in
the SCC was differentially correlated with psychoticism
and ‘need for cognition’ (x, y, z = 6, 24, 3; SVC: x, y,
z = 9, 24, 3, p = 0.036, FWE-corrected; Fig. 3A; Table S3).
In order to explore this difference in more detail, parame-
ter estimates for activation corrected with psychoticsm
and ‘need for cognition’ were extracted and plotted against
the individual scores of both questionnaires. As shown inlitarian judgments. (A) Psychoticism and (B) ‘need for cognition’ showed a
udgments.
Fig. 2. Activation in the SCC showing a negative correlation with ‘psych-
oticism’ scores during counterintuitive utilitarian judgment. The higher
participants scored on the ‘psychoticism’ scale, the lower the activation
level in the SCC during counterintuitive utilitarian judgment. Signiﬁcant
voxels are overlaid onto a standard structural scan in MNI152 space.
Fig. 3. Correlation between personality traits and SCC activation during
counterintuitive utilitarian judgement (multiple regression). (A) SCC
cluster activated during counterintuitive utilitarian judgements showing
a stronger negative correlation with psychoticism than with ‘need for
cognition’. (B) Scatterplot of activation in the SCC (x, y, z = 6, 24, 3)
illustrating the signiﬁcantly negative correlation with psychoticism and
(C) the non-signiﬁcant positive correlation with ‘need for cognition’
during counterintuitive utilitarian judgements.
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correlation with SCC activation during counterintuitive
utilitarian decisions while ‘need for cognition’ was posi-
tively correlated with SCC activity (albeit below statistical
signiﬁcance). Activation in the DLPFC was not differentially
correlated with the two personality traits.
4. Discussion
Some individuals reach utilitarian conclusions that are
contrary to widely held moral views and intuitions. One
way to arrive at such nonconformist or ‘counterintuitive’
conclusions is by subjecting one’s intuitions and emotional
responses to effortful critical scrutiny. Another way is not
to have these intuitions in the ﬁrst place. Are utilitarians
more ‘rational’ and calculating (Greene et al., 2004), or
are they simply colder, and less averse to harming others
(Bartels & Pizarro, 2011)?
Our results offer signiﬁcant further support to the view
that utilitarian judgments are often driven by lack of em-
pathic concern and a diminished aversion to harming oth-
ers. But they only offer a limited and qualiﬁed support for
the view that such judgments might also be driven by ex-
plicit deliberation.
4.1. Cold morality: utilitarian judgment and lack of empathic
concern
At the behavioural level, we found that increased rates
of counterintuitive utilitarian judgment were associated
both with ‘need for cognition’, a tendency to engage in
effortful deliberation, and psychoticism, a personality trait
associated with aggression and lack of empathic concern.
Importantly, these two measures were statistically inde-
pendent, suggesting that they relate to distinct factors
driving utilitarian judgment.
In a previous study we reported that counterintuitive
moral judgments in general, as well as counterintuitive
utilitarian judgments in particular, were associated with
increased activation in the SCC, a brain area implicated inempathic concern and guilt (Decety et al., 2012; Green
et al. 2010; Moll et al. 2006; Zahn et al., 2009a, 2009b),
compared to contrary ‘intuitive’ moral judgments (Kahane
et al., 2012). By contrast, here we found that psychoticism
was at once positively correlated with the number of utili-
tarian judgments and negatively correlated with SCC acti-
vation. This ﬁnding offers signiﬁcant further support to
the hypothesis that utilitarian judgment can be based in
a deﬁcit in empathic concern and social emotion even in
healthy individuals, and suggests that the SCC reﬂects the
degree of aversive response that individuals experience
when they endorse acts that harm others in the context
of making controversial utilitarian judgments.
Previous work has shown that individuals who score
higher on the psychoticism scale are characterized by
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and empathic concern, hostility, and aggression (Eysenck,
1976). Such individuals perceive media violence as more
comical and enjoyable, and show rapid habituation to vio-
lent material (Bruggemann & Barry, 2002), and reduced
aversion to killing enemies in a video game (Ravaja, Turpei-
nen, Saari, Puttonen, & Keltikangas-Jarvinen, 2008). Since
the association between psychoticism and utilitarian judg-
ment related only tomoral dilemmas that typically involved
causing extreme harm to innocents, it is likely that the
observed association between psychoticism and utilitarian
judgment reﬂected a reduced aversion (or even indiffer-
ence) to harming others rather than a general nonconform-
ist tendency.
This interpretation is strongly supported by recent
research associating utilitarian judgmentwithweaker emo-
tional responses to harming others (Moretto et al., 2009;
Cushmanet al., 2012) and lower rates of trait empathy (Choe
& Min, 2011; Crockett et al., 2010), as well as with higher
levels of testosterone (Carney & Mason, 2010). Utilitarian
judgment has also been recently associated with psychopa-
thy (Bartels&Pizarro, 2011;Glennet al., 2010;Koenigset al.,
2012), a trait that is correlated with psychoticism (Hare,
1982; Corr, 2010). This growing body of evidence is also in
line with the inﬂuential proposal that psychopathy is due
to the malfunctioning of a ‘violence inhibition mechanism’
that is naturally operative in most humans (Blair, 1995).
Further research, however, is needed to clarify the pre-
cise relation between psychoticism, SCC activation, and
diminished aversion to harming others. The decreased acti-
vation in the SCC observed here may underlie the set of
dispositions associated with psychoticism, or it might be
a consequence of a greater degree of psychoticism, a causal
question that should be investigated using longitudinal
studies. The relation between the SCC and aversion to
harm also requires further investigation. It seems unlikely
that the observed SCC activation reﬂects an immediate
emotional aversion to the prospect of harming others,
since we previously found that the SCC was associated
with counterintuitive judgments endorsing such harm
rather than with intuitive judgment opposing it (Kahane
et al., 2012). This SCC activation is thus more likely to re-
ﬂect the guilt most individuals experience when they do
agree to harm others, and more generally, to reﬂect a neg-
ative emotional response to the violation of a common
moral norm (in line with Green et al., 2010; Zahn et al.,
2009a, 2009b). Finally, our ﬁndings suggest that damage
to the SCC might be implicated in the increase in utilitarian
judgment observed in patients with VMPFC damage (Cia-
ramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretto et al.,
2009), a hypothesis that, again, needs further investigation.
Contrary to our prediction, psychoticism was not asso-
ciated with lower ratings on a self-report measure of per-
ceived difﬁculty. One possibility is that although it was in
fact easier for individuals with a higher degree of psychot-
icism to make utilitarian judgments compared to other
subjects, they nevertheless did not experience these judg-
ments as subjectively easier. Another possibility is that
participants higher in psychoticism were reluctant to re-
port that they found it easy to endorse acts that directly
harm innocents as others may see this in a negative light.4.2. Calculating morality: utilitarian judgment and need for
cognition
Counterintuitive utilitarian judgments have recently
been associated with feeling guilty (Choe & Min, 2011),
and in a previous study we reported that they were corre-
lated with increased SCC activation, compared to contrary
intuitive judgments (Kahane et al., 2012). These ﬁndings
strongly suggest that although individuals with a higher
degree of psychoticism (or psychopathy) arrive at counter-
intuitive utilitarian conclusions because of a deﬁcit in em-
pathic concern, many individuals nevertheless ﬁnd such
judgments aversive.
Some individuals thus need to effortfully overcome
their natural aversion to harming others when making
counterintuitive utilitarian judgments. It is a further ques-
tion, however, whether explicit deliberation and moral
reasoning play a distinctive role in utilitarian judgment
even in these individuals. Our ﬁnding that ‘need for cogni-
tion’ was associated with greater rates of counterintuitive
utilitarian judgments (yet not with counterintuitive deon-
tological ones) is in line with this hypothesis (see also Bar-
tels, 2008). However, as we previously reported, such
utilitarian judgments were not generally associated with
greater activation in the DLPFC or other brain areas impli-
cated in deliberative processing (Kahane et al., 2012). Nor
did we observe here an association between ‘need for cog-
nition’ and DLPFC activation and other markers of effortful
cognitive effort, such as perceived difﬁculty. This suggests
that ‘need for cognition’ may lead to increased rates of
counterintuitive utilitarian judgment not through greater
engagement in explicit reasoning, but through some other
factor. One possibility is that individuals who are more
strongly disposed to effortful cognition also develop a gen-
eral tendency to discount intuitive or emotional cues, and
to be drawn to solutions to problems that appear more ste-
reotypically calculating and ‘rational’ (for further discus-
sion, see Kahane, 2012). This suggestion is in line with a
recent study that found that a disposition to utilitarian
solutions was associated, not with greater cognitive ability,
but with a difﬁculty with reasoning thoughtfully about
one’s emotions (Koven, 2011).
It is noteworthy that although ‘need for cognition’ was
associated with greater rates of utilitarian judgments in
dilemmas where such judgments were counterintuitive,
it was not associated with greater rates of deontological
judgments in dilemmas where these judgments were coun-
terintuitive. However, since we found no evidence that the
correlation between ‘need for cognition’ and counterintui-
tive utilitarian judgment reﬂects explicit moral reasoning,
this ﬁnding appears to offer little support to the view that
utilitarian judgment is preferentially associated with such
explicit reasoning (Greene, 2008). Moreover, on this latter
view one would expect that extreme counterintuitive
deontological judgments (e.g. refusal to tell a white lie,
however harmful the truth) should be driven by especially
strong immediate emotional responses, predicting both
that such judgments would be negatively correlated with
‘need for cognition’, and that they would be easier to make.
Neither prediction is borne out by our ﬁndings. As
previously reported, such counterintuitive deontological
Fig. 4. Dual pathway to counterintuitive utilitarian judgment. (A) Moral judgments in response to moral dilemmas are often based on an immediate
intuition or affective response. (B) Previous research suggested that some individuals use deliberative effort to overcome this immediate response and reach
counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions. (C) Such utilitarian judgments, however, might also be due to an absent or reduced affective response. Such a lack of
empathic concern appears to drive utilitarian judgment in patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our results, coupled with other
recent research, suggests that it also underlies utilitarian judgment in healthy individuals higher on ‘psychoticism’ or psychopathy.
K. Wiech et al. / Cognition 126 (2013) 364–372 371judgments were perceived as more difﬁcult than contrary
utilitarian ones (Kahane et al., 2012).5. Conclusion
Utilitarianism has often been presented as the reasoned
and systematic generalization of natural human empathic
concern (Hare, 1981; Singer, 1979), and previous research
has portrayed utilitarian judgment as an island of calm
reason in a raging sea of unreﬂective emotional re-
sponse—a rare example of genuine moral reasoning that
can resist immediate gut reactions (Greene, 2008; Greene
et al., 2004).
Recent research has begun to cast doubt on any simple
identiﬁcation of utilitarian judgment with such explicit
deliberation (Moretto, 2009; Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Car-
ney & Mason, 2010; Choe & Min, 2011; Crockett et al.
2010; Glenn et al., 2010; Koven, 2011; Koenings et al.,
2012; Cushman et al., 2012). Our neuroimaging ﬁndings
offer signiﬁcant further evidence that counterintuitive util-
itarian judgments are often driven, not by rational reﬂec-
tion or ‘generalized benevolence’ (Smart, 1961), but by a
deﬁcit in empathic concern and an indifference to harming
others (see Fig. 4). One is reminded of John Stuart Mill’s re-
mark on Jeremy Bentham, the founding father of utilitari-
anism: ‘‘[i]n many of the most natural and strongest
feelings of human nature he had no sympathy’’ (Ryan,
1987).
Moreover, although a lack of aversion to harming might
lead to greater rates of utilitarian judgment in certain con-
texts, such a disposition is highly problematic even from a
utilitarian standpoint. Utilitarian thinkers often argue that
a strong aversion to harming others is itself of great utility
because, although it can lead to suboptimal choices in
some situations, in the long run it would lead to better con-sequences than a cold and calculating attitude that is not
constrained by such aversion (Sidgwick, 1907).
We do not want to be the slaves of our passions and
intuitions. We admire the capacity to arrive at counterintu-
itive moral conclusions when it is based in a tendency to
critically reﬂect on and, when appropriate, overcome com-
mon moral intuitions. The association between counterin-
tuitive utilitarian judgement and a tendency to seek
effortful cognitive activity can thus seem to favour such
judgments (Greene, 2008). But the parallel association
with lack of empathic concern and antisocial tendencies
is rather less ﬂattering (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011)—a ten-
dency to endorse counterintuitive views is sinister when
it merely reﬂects an indifference to harming others and a
lack of responsiveness to common norms.
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